preSaleMasterForToken.sol
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | initializePresale | Resolved |
Description
There is no guarantee that the owner deposits will satisfy the presale and liquidity rates.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Best Practice | Medium | contribute, claim, finalize | Resolved |
Description
The functions call external contracts, exposing themselves to potential reentrancy attacks.
Recommendation
Add a reentrancy guard and follow check-effect interactions pattern.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Best Practice | Informational | contribute | Resolved |
Description
Use a modifier instead of the presale
require statement for better readability.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | Medium | contribute | Resolved |
Description
The
investor array's size is limitless. Iterating over an unbounded array may cause the transaction to hit the block gas limit.Recommendation
Use a mapping to track contributions.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | High | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
The function does not change the user's deposit value, hence any user can withdraw their deposit multiple times and drain the contract.
Recommendation
Add a require statements that makes sure the user can withdraw their deposit and set
deposits[msg.sender] to 0 after the withdrawal.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | Low | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
The function does not remove the user from the
investors array.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Owner Capabilities | Low | finalize | Resolved |
Description
The owner can lock funds in the contracts by never calling this function if the presale exceeds
softcapType | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | finalize | Resolved |
Description
listingRate does not subtract the fees taken from the amount listed. Consequently, users may be unable to withdraw their tokens from the contract as the amount of tokens listed does not match the actual amount of tokens in the contract.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | finalize | Resolved |
Description
The contract multiplies
listingRate by the amount of amount to get the number of tokens. Therefore, listingRate should be calculated as token/ETH (token per ETH). However it is currently calculated as ETH/token (ETH per token)
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | Low | finalize | Resolved |
Description
If a liquidity pool already exists, there may unrecoverable leftover tokens in the contract.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Gas Optimization | Informational | addWhitelist | Resolved |
Description
Move the following line into the
if block to avoid storing the value in storage.whiteList[accounts[index]] = true;
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Gas Optimization | Informational | removeWhitelist | Resolved |
Description
The removal can be done in constant time by passing the indexes if the accounts to remove.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | getVestedAmount | Resolved |
Description
listingRate is multiplied by a factor.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | Medium | getVestedAmount | Resolved |
Description
The function may be called anytime. Should the function be called before
presaleEndTimestamp, (now - presaleEndTimeStamp) will underflow.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
deposits[msg.sender] is zeroed and then sent out as the value, so users will always withdraw 0 tokens - the value must be kept aside before zeroing it out.
deposits[msg.sender] = 0;
Address.sendValue(msg.sender, deposits[msg.sender]);
Last modified 6mo ago