fairLaunchToken.sol

Issue 01

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

initializePresale

Resolved

Description

There is no guarantee that the owner deposits will satisfy the presale and liquidity rates.

Issue 02

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Best Practice

Informational

initializable

Resolved

Description

The name of the function is misleading. A more appropriate name could be onlyBeforeInitialized.

Issue 03

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Best Practice

Informational

contribute

Resolved

Description

Use a modifier instead of the presale require statement for better readability.

Issue 04

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Volatile Code

Medium

contribute

Resolved

Description

The investor array's size is limitless. Iterating over an unbounded array may cause the transaction to hit the block gas limit.

Recommendation

Use a mapping to track contributions.

Issue 05

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

Medium

contribute

Resolved

Description

safeTransferFrom does not support withFeesOnTransfer. Hence, when calling refund, users will receive their original transfer amount without deducting fees.

Issue 06

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Best Practice

Medium

claim, finalize

Resolved

Description

The functions call external contracts, exposing themselves to potential reentrancy attacks.

The code does not follow check effect interactions pattern.

Recommendation

Follow check-effect interactions pattern.

Issue 07

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Volatile Code

High

withdrawContribute

Resolved

Description

The function does not change the user's deposit value, hence any user can withdraw their deposit multiple times and drain the contract.

Recommendation

Add a require statements that makes sure the user can withdraw their deposit and set deposits[msg.sender] to 0 after the withdrawal.

Issue 08

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

Low

withdrawContribute

Resolved

Description

The function does not remove the user from the investors array.

Issue 09

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Owner Capabilities

Low

finalize

Resolved

Description

The owner can lock funds in the contracts by never calling this function if the presale exceeds softcap

Issue 10

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

finalize

Resolved

Description

listingRate does not subtract the fees taken from the amount listed. Consequently, users may be unable to withdraw their tokens from the contract as the amount of tokens listed does not match the actual amount of tokens in the contract.

Issue 11

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

finalize

Resolved

Description

The contract multiplies listingRate by the amount of amount to get the number of tokens. Therefore, listingRate should be calculated as token/ETH (token per ETH). However it is currently calculated as ETH/token (ETH per token)

Issue 12

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Volatile Code

Informational

finalize

Not Resolved

Description

The function calls safeTransfer multiple times. However, these calls may fail by the recipient, reverting the entire transaction.

Recommendation

Consider wrapping these calls inside try-catch or change the transfer mechanism into a withdraw function that will be called by the recipients.

Issue 13

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

Low

finalize

Resolved

Description

If a liquidity pool already exists, there may unrecoverable leftover tokens in the contract.

Issue 14

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

getVestedAmount

Resolved

Description

return user.mul(listingRate);

listingRate is multiplied by a factor.

Issue 15

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Volatile Code

Medium

getVestedAmount

Resolved

Description

The function may be called anytime. Should the function be called before presaleEndTimestamp, (now - presaleEndTimeStamp) will underflow.

Issue 16

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

withdrawContribute

Resolved

Description

deposits[msg.sender] is zeroed and then sent out as the value, so users will always withdraw 0 tokens - the value must be kept aside before zeroing it out.

deposits[msg.sender] = 0;
Address.sendValue(msg.sender, deposits[msg.sender]);

Issue 17

Type

Severity

Location

Status

Logical Issue

High

finalize

Resolved

Description

A malicious user can send extra tokens to the contract and prevent this function from ever succeeding.

require(IBEP20(buyToken).balanceOf(address(this)) <= maxOwnerReceive, "too much");
IBEP20(buyToken).safeTransfer(owner(), IBEP20(buyToken).balanceOf(address(this)));

Recommendation

Find a use for the leftover funds - should they go to blitz? To liquidity? To holders?

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