fairLaunch.sol
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | initializePresale | Resolved |
Description
There is no guarantee that the owner deposits will satisfy the presale and liquidity rates.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Best Practice | Informational | contribute | Resolved |
Description
Use a modifier instead of the presale
require statement for better readabilityType | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | Medium | contribute | Resolved |
Description
The
investor array's size is limitless. Iterating over an unbounded array may cause the transaction to hit the block gas limit.Recommendation
Use a mapping to track contributions.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Best Practice | Medium | claim, finalize | Resolved |
Description
The functions call external contracts, exposing themselves to potential reentrancy attacks.
Example:
IBEP20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, claimableAmount);
claimed[msg.sender] = claimed[msg.sender] + claimableAmount;
totalClaimedAmount = totalClaimedAmount + claimableAmount;
Recommendation
Add a reentrancy guard or follow check-effect interactions pattern. check-effect interaction pattern is more recommended because reentrancy guard has limitations such us calling other function which has reentrancy guard protection will cause an error.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | High | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
The function does not change the user's deposit value, hence any user can withdraw their deposit multiple times and drain the contract.
Recommendation
Add a require statements that makes sure the user can withdraw their deposit and set
deposits[msg.sender] to 0 after the withdrawal.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | Informational | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
The function does not remove the user from the
investors array.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Owner Capabilities | Low | finalize | Resolved |
Description
The owner can lock funds in the contracts by never calling this function if the presale exceeds
softcapType | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | finalize | Resolved |
Description
The contract multiplies
listingRate by the amount of amount to get the number of tokens. Therefore, listingRate should be calculated as token/ETH (token per ETH). However it is currently calculated as ETH/token (ETH per token)
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | finalize | Resolved |
Description
listingRate does not subtract the fees taken from the total token amount as service fee. Consequently, users may be unable to withdraw their tokens from the contract as the amount of tokens for users does not match the actual amount of tokens in the contract (It will be less).Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | Low | finalize | Resolved |
Description
If a liquidity pool already exists, there may unrecoverable leftover tokens in the contract. The issue was resolved for eth and not for tokens.
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | Informational | finalize | Not Resolved |
Description
The function calls
sendValue multiple times. However, these calls may fail by the recipient, reverting the entire transaction.Recommendation
Consider wrapping these calls inside try-catch or change the transfer mechanism into a
withdraw function that will be called by the recipients.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | getVestedAmount | Resolved |
Description
return user.mul(listingRate);
listingRate is multiplied by a factor.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Volatile Code | Medium | getVestedAmount | Resolved |
Description
The function may be called anytime. Should the function be called before
presaleEndTimestamp, (now - presaleEndTimeStamp) will underflow.Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | withdrawContribute | Resolved |
Description
deposits[msg.sender] is zeroed and then sent out as the value, so users will always withdraw 0 tokens - the value must be kept aside before zeroing it out.
deposits[msg.sender] = 0;
Address.sendValue(msg.sender, deposits[msg.sender]);
Type | Severity | Location | Status |
Logical Issue | High | finalize | Resolved |
Description
A malicious user can send extra eth to the contract and prevent this function from ever succeeding.
require(address(this).balance <= maxOwnerReceive, "too much");
Address.sendValue(owner(), address(this).balance);
Recommendation
Find a use for the leftover funds - should they go to blitz? To liquidity? To holders?
- There are many "magic numbers" scattered in the contract. Consider using constants with meaningful names for better readability and to decrease human errors.
- There are many functions that accept parameters from users without validating them. When receiving input from external callers, make sure the values meet certain criteria in order to save gas costs and prevent bugs.
Last modified 6mo ago